CACI 2521A Work Environment Harassment—Conduct Directed at Plaintiff—Essential Factual Elements—Employer or Entity Defendant (Gov. Code, §§ 12923, 12940(j))
California Civil Jury Instructions CACI
California Civil Jury Instructions CACI
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was subjected to harassment based on [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] [describe protected status, e.g., race, gender, or age] at [name of defendant] and that this harassment created a work environment that was hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, or abusive.
To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] and that this harassment created a work environment that was hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, or abusive.
1.That [name of plaintiff] was [an employee of/a person providing services under a contract with/an unpaid intern with/a volunteer with] [name of defendant];
2.That [name of plaintiff] was subjected to harassing conduct because [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was [protected status, e.g., a woman];
3.That the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive;
4.That a reasonable [e.g., woman] in [name of plaintiff]’s circumstances would have considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, or abusive;
5.That [name of plaintiff] considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, or abusive;
6.[Select applicable basis of defendant’s liability:]
[That a supervisor engaged in the conduct;]
[That [name of defendant] [or [his/her/nonbinary pronoun/its] supervisors or agents] knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action;]
7.That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
8.That the conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
Derived from former CACI No. 2521 December 2007; Revised June 2013, December 2015, May 2018, July 2019, May 2020
This instruction is for use in a hostile work environment case when the defendant is an employer or other entity covered by the FEHA. For an individual defendant, such as the alleged harasser or plaintiff’s coworker, see CACI No. 2522A, Work Environment Harassment—Conduct Directed at Plaintiff—Essential Factual Elements—Individual Defendant. For a case in which the plaintiff is not the target of the harassment, see CACI No. 2521B, Work Environment Harassment—Conduct Directed at Others—Essential Factual Elements—Employer or Entity Defendant. For an instruction for use if the hostile environment is due to sexual favoritism, see CACI No. 2521C, Work Environment Harassment—Sexual Favoritism—Essential Factual Elements—Employer or Entity Defendant. Also read CACI No. 2523, “Harassing Conduct” Explained, and CACI No. 2524, “Severe or Pervasive” Explained.
Modify element 2 if plaintiff was not actually a member of the protected class, but alleges harassment because the plaintiff was perceived to be a member, or associated with someone who was or was perceived to be a member, of the protected class. (See Gov. Code, § 12926(o).)
In element 6, select the applicable basis of employer liability: (a) strict liability for a supervisor’s harassing conduct, or (b) the employer’s ratification of the conduct. For a definition of “supervisor,” see CACI No. 2525, Harassment—“Supervisor” Defined. If there are both employer and individual supervisor defendants (see CACI No. 2522A, Work Environment Harassment—Conduct Directed at Plaintiff—Essential Factual Elements—Individual Defendant) and both are found liable, they are both jointly and severally liable for any damages. Comparative fault and Proposition 51 do not apply to the employer’s strict liability for supervisor harassment. (State Dept. of Health Servs. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1041–1042 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 441, 79 P.3d 556]; see Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 1000 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 787], disapproved on other grounds in Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179]; see also Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1851 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 411] [Proposition 51 cannot be applied to those who are without fault and only have vicarious liability by virtue of some statutory fiat].)
•Legislative Intent With Regard to Application of the Laws About Harassment. Government Code section 12923.
•Harassment Prohibited Under Fair Employment and Housing Act. Government Code section 12940(j)(1).
•“Employer” Defined for Harassment. Government Code section 12940(j)(4)(A).
•Harassment Because of Sex. Government Code section 12940(j)(4)(C).
•Person Providing Services Under Contract. Government Code section 12940(j)(5).
•Aiding and Abetting Fair Employment and Housing Act Violations. Government Code section 12940(i).
•Perception and Association. Government Code section 12926(o).
•“To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [plaintiff’s] protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff’s] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].)
•“[T]he adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, ‘the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.’ It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’ ” (Harris v. Forklift Sys. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 25 [114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295], conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.; see Gov. Code, § 12923(a) endorsing this language as reflective of California law.)
•“[A]n employer is strictly liable for all acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor.” (State Dept. of Health Servs., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1042.)
•“The applicable language of the FEHA does not suggest that an employer’s liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor is constrained by principles of agency law. Had the Legislature so intended, it would have used language in the FEHA imposing the negligence standard of liability on acts of harassment by an employee ‘other than an agent,’ ‘not acting as the employer’s agent,’ or ‘not acting within the scope of an agency for the employer.’ By providing instead in section 12940, subdivision (j)(1), that the negligence standard applies to acts of harassment ‘by an employee other than an agent or supervisor’ (italics added), the Legislature has indicated that all acts of harassment by a supervisor are to be exempted from the negligence standard, whether or not the supervisor was then acting as the employer’s agent, and that agency principles come into play only when the harasser is not a supervisor. (State Dept. of Health Services, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1041, original italics.)
•“When the harasser is a nonsupervisory employee, employer liability turns on a showing of negligence (that is, the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action).” (Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 952 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 464].)
•“If an employee other than an agent or supervisor commits the harassment, and the employer takes immediate and appropriate corrective action when it becomes or reasonably should become aware of the conduct—for example, when the victim or someone else informs the employer—there simply is no ‘unlawful employment practice’ that the FEHA governs.” (Carrisales v. Dept. of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1136 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083], called into doubt on other grounds by statute.)
•“[I]n order for the employer to avoid strict liability for the supervisor’s actions under the FEHA, the harassment must result from a completely private relationship unconnected with the employment. Otherwise, the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor’s actions regardless of whether the supervisor was acting as the employer’s agent.” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1421 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 501].)
•Employers may be liable for the conduct of certain agents. (See Gov. Code, §§ 12925(d), 12926(d), and 12940(j)(1) and Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333] [California Supreme Court declined to express opinion whether “agent” language in the FEHA merely incorporates respondeat superior principles or has some other meaning].)
•“Here, [defendant] was jointly liable with its employees on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory on every cause of action in which it was named as a defendant.” (Bihun, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000.)
•“The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply to [plaintiff]’s harassment claim either. Since ‘there is no possible justification for harassment in the workplace,’ an employer cannot offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for it.” (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 927 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 286].)
•“[A]lthough no California cases have directly addressed racial harassment in the workplace, the California courts have applied the federal threshold standard to claims of sexual harassment and held that FEHA is violated when the harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’ ” (Etter v. Veriflo Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 457, 464–465 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 33], internal citations and footnote omitted.)
•“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ the law is violated.” (Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., Inc. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, 409 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 457], internal citation omitted.)
•“[N]ot every utterance of a racial slur in the workplace violates the FEHA or Title VII. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized in the context of sexual harassment: ‘[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as “harassment” affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment within the meaning of Title VII. For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive “to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” ’ … ‘Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.’ … California courts have adopted the same standard in evaluating claims under the FEHA.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 129–130 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846], internal citations omitted.)
•“To be actionable, ‘a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’ That means a plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or abusive will not prevail under the FEHA, if a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances, would not share the same perception. Likewise, a plaintiff who does not perceive the workplace as hostile or abusive will not prevail, even if it objectively is so.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 284 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211], internal citations omitted.)
•“The stray remarks doctrine … allows a court to weigh and assess the remarks in isolation, and to disregard the potentially damaging nature of discriminatory remarks simply because they are made by ‘nondecisionmakers, or [made] by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process.’ [Defendant] also argues that ambiguous remarks are stray, irrelevant, prejudicial, and inadmissible. However, ‘the task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment.’ Determining the weight of discriminatory or ambiguous remarks is a role reserved for the jury.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 540–541 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 235 P.3d 988], internal citations omitted.)
•“[I]n reviewing the trial court’s grant of [defendant]’s summary judgment motion, the Court of Appeal properly considered evidence of alleged discriminatory comments made by decision makers and coworkers along with all other evidence in the record.” (Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 545.)
•“[M]any employment cases present issues of intent, and motive, and hostile working environment, issues not determinable on paper. Such cases, we caution, are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment, however liberalized it be.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 286 [100 Cal.Rptr.3d 296].)
•“In contending that the ‘subjectively offensive’ element was not proven, a defendant ‘will assert that a plaintiff consented to the conduct through active participation in it, or was not injured because the plaintiff did not subjectively find it abusive.’ [¶] [Evidence Code] Section 1106 limits the evidence the defendant may use to support this assertion. It provides that ‘[i]n any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct, or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by the plaintiff or the absence of injury to the plaintiff … .’ This general rule is, however, subject to the exception that it ‘does not apply to evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct with the alleged perpetrator.’ The term ‘sexual conduct’ within the meaning of section 1106 has been broadly construed to include ‘all active or passive behavior (whether statements or actions), that either directly or through reasonable inference establishes a plaintiff’s willingness to engage in sexual activity,’ including ‘racy banter, sexual horseplay, and statements concerning prior, proposed, or planned sexual exploits.’ ” (Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 874 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 161], internal citations omitted.)
•“[A]llegations of a racially hostile work-place must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff.” (McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp. (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d 1103, 1115.)
•“Under … FEHA, sexual harassment can occur between members of the same gender as long as the plaintiff can establish the harassment amounted to discrimination because of sex.” (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1525 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 794], original italics.)
•“[T]here is no requirement that the motive behind the sexual harassment must be sexual in nature. ‘[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.’ Sexual harassment occurs when, as is alleged in this case, sex is used as a weapon to create a hostile work environment.” (Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1564 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 597], original italics, internal citation omitted.)
•“The plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct took place because of the plaintiff’s sex, but need not show that the conduct was motivated by sexual desire. For example, a female plaintiff can prevail by showing that the harassment was because of the defendant’s bias against women; she need not show that it was because of the defendant’s sexual interest in women. In every case, however, the plaintiff must show a discriminatory intent or motivation based on gender.” (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 384], internal citations omitted.)
•“[A] heterosexual male is subjected to harassment because of sex under the FEHA when attacks on his heterosexual identity are used as a tool of harassment in the workplace, irrespective of whether the attacks are motivated by sexual desire or interest.” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239–1240 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 676].)
•“A recent legislative amendment modifies section 12940, subdivision (j)(4)(C) (a provision of FEHA specifying types of conduct that constitute harassment because of sex) to read: ‘For purposes of this subdivision, “harassment” because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 fn. 8, original italics.)
•“California courts have held so-called ‘me too’ evidence, that is, evidence of gender bias against employees other than the plaintiff, may be admissible evidence in discrimination and harassment cases.” (Meeks, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 871.)