CACI 1125 Conditions on Adjacent Property
California Civil Jury Instructions CACI
1125 Conditions on Adjacent Property
[Name of public entity defendant]’s property may be considered dangerous if [a] condition[s] on adjacent property contribute[s] to exposing those using [name of public entity defendant]’s property to a substantial risk of injury.
[Name of plaintiff] claims that the following condition[s] on adjacent property contributed to making [name of public entity defendant]’s property dangerous: [specify]. You should consider [this/these] condition[s] in deciding whether [name of public entity defendant]’s property was in a dangerous condition.
Directions for Use
Give this instruction if the plaintiff claims that conditions on property adjacent to the public property that is alleged to be dangerous contributed to making the public property dangerous. This instruction should be given with, and not instead of, the applicable basic instructions for dangerous conditions on public property (see CACI Nos. 1100 through 1103).
This instruction is for use when a plaintiff’s claim involves conditions on property adjacent to the public property. A different instruction will be required if a dangerous condition on public property creates a substantial risk of injury to one using adjacent property.
Sources and Authority
•“A California Law Revision Commission comment accompanying the statute’s 1963 enactment expands on the relationship between public property and adjacent property with regard to dangerous conditions: ‘ “Adjacent property” as used in the definition of “dangerous condition” refers to the area that is exposed to the risk created by a dangerous condition of the public property. … [¶] … A public entity may be liable only for dangerous conditions of its own property. But its own property may be considered dangerous if it creates a substantial risk of injury to adjacent property or to persons on adjacent property; and its own property may be considered dangerous if a condition on the adjacent property exposes those using the public property to a substantial risk of injury.’ ” (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 147–148 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 65 P.3d 807].)
•“The third and fourth sentences of the City’s ‘[d]esign of the [d]riveway’ instruction improperly told the jury that it could not ‘rely on’ elements of the driveway, including ‘the placement of the stop sign, the left turn pocket, and the presence of the pink cement’ in deciding whether ‘a dangerous condition existed.’ This was legally incorrect, and it directly conflicted with another instruction given to the jury, which told it that the City’s ‘property may be considered dangerous if a condition on adjacent property, such as the pink stamped concrete or the location of the stop sign, exposes those using the public property to a substantial risk of injury in conjunction with the adjacent property.’ Giving the jury these two conflicting instructions could not have been anything but hopelessly confusing to the jury.” (Guernsey v. City of Salinas (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 269, 281–282 [241 Cal.Rptr.3d 335].)