CACI 3509A Precondemnation Damages—Unreasonable Delay (Klopping Damages)
California Civil Jury Instructions CACI
3509A Precondemnation Damages—Unreasonable Delay (Klopping Damages)
I have determined that [insert one or both of the following:]
[there was an unreasonable delay between [date of announcement of intent to condemn], when the [name of condemnor] announced its intent to condemn [name of property owner]’s property, and [date of filing], when this case was filed] [and]
[insert description of unreasonable conduct].
In determining just compensation you must award damages that [name of property owner] has suffered as a result of the [name of condemnor]’s [delay/[describe unreasonable conduct]]. These damages may include [insert damages appropriate to the facts, e.g., the cost of repairs, the loss of use of the property, loss of rent, loss of profits, or increased operating expenses pending repairs, and diminution of market value].
New September 2003; Revised and Renumbered May 2017
Directions for Use
This instruction will need to be modified if the entity does not ultimately proceed with the condemnation, or if there has been another type of unreasonable conduct other than unreasonable delay.
For an instruction on precondemnation damages arising from the public entity’s authorized entry to investigate suitability of the property for the project, see CACI No. 3509B, Precondemnation Damages—Public Entity’s Authorized Entry to Investigate Property’s Suitability.
Sources and Authority
•“[A] condemnee must be provided with an opportunity to demonstrate that (1) the public authority acted improperly either by unreasonably delaying eminent domain action following an announcement of intent to condemn or by other unreasonable conduct prior to condemnation; and (2) as a result of such action the property in question suffered a diminution in market value.” (Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 52 [104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345].)
•“The measure of damages may be the cost of repairs, the loss of use of the property, loss of rent, loss of profits, or increased operating expenses pending repairs.” (City of Los Angeles v. Tilem (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [191 Cal.Rptr. 229], internal citations omitted.)
•“[A]bsent a formal resolution of condemnation, recovery under Klopping requires that the public entity’s conduct ‘directly and specially affect the landowner to his injury.’ This requirement mandates that the plaintiff demonstrate conduct on the part of the public entity ‘which significantly invaded or appropriated the use or enjoyment’ of the property.” (Barthelemy v. Orange County Flood Control Dist. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 558, 570 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 575], internal citations omitted.)
•“[S]ince Klopping damages compensate a landowner for a public entity’s unreasonable precondemnation conduct, their recovery ‘is permitted irrespective of whether condemnation proceedings are abandoned or whether they are instituted at all.’ ” (Barthelemy, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 569, original italics, internal citation omitted.)
•“Klopping does not permit an owner to recover precondemnation damages for general market decline as that is not attributable to the condemner.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. McNamara (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1209 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 812].)
•“Whether there has been unreasonable delay by the condemner and whether the condemner has engaged in unreasonable conduct are both questions of fact. What constitutes a direct and substantial impairment of property rights for purposes of compensation is also a factual question. In deciding factual matters on conflicting testimony and inferences, it is for the trier of fact to determine which evidence and inferences it finds more reasonable.” (Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 883, 897 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 272], internal citations omitted.)
•“Whether the public entity has acted unreasonably is a question of fact. ‘However, the threshold question of liability for unreasonable precondemnation conduct is to be determined by the court, with the issue of the amount of damages to be thereafter submitted to the jury only upon a sufficient showing of liability by the condemnee.’ Because inverse condemnation damages for precondemnation conduct must be claimed in a pending eminent domain action, the appropriate procedure is to bifurcate the trial of the action so that the question of the liability of the public entity is first adjudicated by the court without a jury.” (City of Ripon v. Sweetin (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 887, 897 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 802], original italics, internal citations omitted.)